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Abstract
The 2018 Skripal poisonings prompted the heavy securitisation of UK-Russian relations. 
Despite the ensuing tight coordination between the Russian government and state-
aligned television, this article argues that in today’s mediatised environment – in which 
social and political activities fuse inextricably with their own mediation – even non-
democracies must cope with the shaping of global communications by media logics and 
related market imperatives. With a range of media actors responding to events, and 
to each other, on multiple digital platforms, no state could assert full narrative control 
over the Skripal incident. Counterintuitively, Russian journalists’ journalistic agency was 
enhanced by mediatisation processes: their state sponsors, seeking to instrumentalise 
reporting, delegated agency to journalists more attuned to such processes; yet 
commercial imperatives obliged them to perform independence and professional 
credibility. These competing forms of agency clashed with one another, and with that of 
the audiences engaging in real time with the journalists’ outputs, ultimately undermining 
the Russian state’s efforts to harness news coverage to its political and security goals. 
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The article concludes that in today’s global communications environment, mediatisation 
substantially constrains the ability of non-democracies to micro-manage journalists’ 
treatment of major events relating to national security.
Keywords
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On 4 March 2018, Russian-British double-agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia 
were found slumped on a bench in Salisbury. Eight days later, Theresa May announced 
that it was ‘highly likely that Russia was responsible’ for poisoning the Skripals using a 
nerve agent, in ‘an indiscriminate and reckless act’ (May quoted in BBC, 2018). As one 
BBC journalist noted, her statement ‘sounded like. . . if not a prelude to war, certainly 
like the onset of a serious international crisis’ (Urban, 2018: 248). The poisoning, which 
later took the life of a local resident, Dawn Sturgess, produced contradictory statements 
from state-affiliated actors on both sides, as the UK and Russia promoted their preferred 
narratives. In September 2018, CCTV footage emerged of two Russian suspects later 
identified through open-source journalism as Russian military intelligence (GRU) 
agents, who denied their guilt in an interview on Russia’s state-funded international 
broadcaster, RT. The battle of narratives highlighted the crucial role of the media in con-
temporary global politics.
This role is widely recognised in academic literature, feeding into a growing body of 
work on what is often termed ‘information war’ between Russia and ‘the West’. The 
‘information-war’ literature foregrounds three interconnected features of Russian media 
operations. One is the supposedly distinct nature of the Russian media system, in which 
media communication flows differ from those in democratic polities (Hoskins and 
Shchelin, 2018: 251). Second, this distinctiveness, it is argued, arises from the effective-
ness with which the Russian state, implicitly understood to be a single actor and usually 
equated with ‘the Kremlin’, manipulates to its own advantage ‘the abundance, connec-
tivity and complexity of information’ (Hoskins and Shchelin, 2018: 251; see also 
Pomerantsev, 2015). Third, priority is accorded to publics responding to the Kremlin’s 
message as intended (McIntosh, 2015: 299; Paul and Matthews, 2016). Overall, aca-
demic literature implies an effectively coordinated, hierarchically-structured propaganda 
machine, with the Kremlin as the chief puppeteer of an ‘army’ of state-funded broadcast 
and on-line actors, including trolls and bots (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2015: 1321; 
Meijas and Vokuev, 2017: 1032; Paul and Matthews, 2016; Pomerantsev and Weiss, 
2014: 31).
Missing from the ‘information-war’ account is full recognition of the transformative 
effects of mediatisation – ‘a process through which core elements of a social or cultural 
activity. . . assume media form’ (Hjarvard, 2004: 48). The term highlights a more perva-
sive presence of the media in every aspect of people’s life today, thus being different 
from the much older phenomenon of mediation, that is, the situation when the media is 
the most important source of information and channel of communication between 
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The article concludes that in today’s global communications environment, mediatisation 
substantially constrains the ability of non-democracies to micro-manage journalists’ 
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On 4 March 2018, Russian-British double-agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia 
were found slumped on a bench in Salisbury. Eight days later, Theresa May announced 
that it was ‘highly likely that Russia was responsible’ for poisoning the Skripals using a 
nerve agent, in ‘an indiscriminate and reckless act’ (May quoted in BBC, 2018). As one 
BBC journalist noted, her statement ‘sounded like. . . if not a prelude to war, certainly 
like the onset of a serious international crisis’ (Urban, 2018: 248). The poisoning, which 
later took the life of a local resident, Dawn Sturgess, produced contradictory statements 
from state-affiliated actors on both sides, as the UK and Russia promoted their preferred 
narratives. In September 2018, CCTV footage emerged of two Russian suspects later 
identified through open-source journalism as Russian military intelligence (GRU) 
agents, who denied their guilt in an interview on Russia’s state-funded international 
broadcaster, RT. The battle of narratives highlighted the crucial role of the media in con-
temporary global politics.
This role is widely recognised in academic literature, feeding into a growing body of 
work on what is often termed ‘information war’ between Russia and ‘the West’. The 
‘information-war’ literature foregrounds three interconnected features of Russian media 
operations. One is the supposedly distinct nature of the Russian media system, in which 
media communication flows differ from those in democratic polities (Hoskins and 
Shchelin, 2018: 251). Second, this distinctiveness, it is argued, arises from the effective-
ness with which the Russian state, implicitly understood to be a single actor and usually 
equated with ‘the Kremlin’, manipulates to its own advantage ‘the abundance, connec-
tivity and complexity of information’ (Hoskins and Shchelin, 2018: 251; see also 
Pomerantsev, 2015). Third, priority is accorded to publics responding to the Kremlin’s 
message as intended (McIntosh, 2015: 299; Paul and Matthews, 2016). Overall, aca-
demic literature implies an effectively coordinated, hierarchically-structured propaganda 
machine, with the Kremlin as the chief puppeteer of an ‘army’ of state-funded broadcast 
and on-line actors, including trolls and bots (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2015: 1321; 
Meijas and Vokuev, 2017: 1032; Paul and Matthews, 2016; Pomerantsev and Weiss, 
2014: 31).
Missing from the ‘information-war’ account is full recognition of the transformative 
effects of mediatisation – ‘a process through which core elements of a social or cultural 
activity. . . assume media form’ (Hjarvard, 2004: 48). The term highlights a more perva-
sive presence of the media in every aspect of people’s life today, thus being different 
from the much older phenomenon of mediation, that is, the situation when the media is 
the most important source of information and channel of communication between 
governments and citizens (Strömbäck, 2008: 229–231). The dynamics of mediatisation, 
which are inevitably transnational and include an ever-increasing range of media actors, 
cannot be instrumentalised as envisaged by proponents of information-war accounts. 
Indeed, the age of mediatisation is characterised by a complex system of transnational 
assemblages of actors operating within the hybrid media environment (Chadwick, 2013). 
State-affiliated broadcasters operate amongst a wider range of actors communicating a 
range of opinions in record speed through digital media technologies (Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin, 2010). This contested space accommodates a degree of individual agency, 
allowing journalists to exploit ‘instances of interaction involving diverse news creators’ 
(Chadwick, 2013: 74), and the temporary affiliations of media actors. At times such 
alignments support state-endorsed narratives; at others, they reflect various market-
driven imperatives associated with mediatisation (Strömbäck, 2008).
Recognising the impact of mediatisation on Russian media coverage of the Salisbury 
poisoning, we challenge ‘information-war’ accounts in three ways. First, we suggest that 
the distinctiveness of the Russian media ecology has been overstated, leading to the mis-
placed assumption that Russia can be analysed as an isolated outlier, immune to media-
tisation effects. Second, ignoring mediatisation leads scholars to inflate the levels of state 
coordination in Russia’s media campaigns and to underappreciate the agency of indi-
vidual actors, including Russian state-affiliated journalists, and the digitally-empowered 
audiences who have become media actors in their own right. Finally, it produces exag-
gerated accounts of state-funded media executives’ effectiveness at ‘arresting’ chaotic 
global information flows, and ‘harnessing’ them to influence multiple publics (Hoskins 
and O’Loughlin, 2015).
We provide a corrective to such portrayals of Russia’s media system, highlighting the 
journalistic agency within it, and address the following questions: How does mediatisa-
tion shape Russia’s state-media-publics relationship? What role do participatory online 
audiences play in this process? What does this environment mean for the agency of 
individual journalists, and for Russian news-making?
Mediatisation phases and media events
The concept of mediatisation captures the state of contemporary societies where ‘the 
media have penetrated the fabric of politics, war. . . and even everyday life, to the extent 
that they no longer “mediate” events external to them but have fused with those events.’ 
(Hutchings, 2019: 5). The fact that non-democratic states like Russia are not immune to 
global mediatisation trends is intuited by perceptive scholars and journalists (Galeotti, 
2018; Pomerantsev, 2013) who, however, do not explicitly deploy this concept. It is only 
recently, then, that a few analyses have emerged of how mediatisation plays out in the 
Russian context, particularly in relation to the role of audiences and their interaction with 
‘traditional’ media outlets in the production of mediated narratives (Bodrunova et al, 
2017; Hutchings, 2019; Kalinina and Menke, 2016; Zassoursky, 2016).
The lacuna is unsurprising. Mediatisation scholars tend to foreground media inde-
pendence as a precondition for mediatisation (Strömbäck, 2008: 233–234), and even 
promote its potential for deepening democracy (Couldry, 2008), whereas most Russian 
media research focuses on political control. However, in a global media environment, 
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mediatisation trends do impact non-democratic states, albeit in specific ways. Our exam-
ination of mediatisation in the Russian context allows us to highlight similarities and 
differences in the functioning of media systems in democratic and non-democratic 
contexts.
Under the conditions of mediatisation, politics becomes increasingly ‘dependent in its 
central functions on mass media’ and is ‘continuously shaped by interactions’ with them 
(Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999: 205). Strömbäck’s theory of mediatisation traces four 
phases of change in the balance between the political and media logics shaping political 
communication. Media logic entails news-production according to journalistic criteria, 
commercial imperatives and technological conditions, prioritising audience interests. 
Political logic, however, requires the needs of political institutions and the political sys-
tem to be placed centre stage (Strömbäck, 2008).
At Strömbäck’s first phase of mediatisation, the mass media begin constituting the 
main communication channel between citizens and politicians. At Phase II, the media 
cease unconditionally mediating the messages preferred by political actors. It is at this 
point that commercial imperatives assert themselves in a context when the battle for 
people’s attention takes precedence over traditional journalistic norms and values 
(Strömbäck, 2008: 237–240). Landerer goes further, redefining mediatisation itself as 
‘the predominance of audience-oriented market logic in political actors’ behaviour in 
day-to-day decision-making processes’ (2013: 240). At Strömbäck’s third phase, politi-
cal and social actors must adapt to a fully marketised media logic rather than the reverse 
(2008: 238). In the fourth phase, ‘more or less consciously [political actors] allow media 
logic’ and its accompanying commerce-driven standards of newsworthiness to ‘become 
a built-in part of the governing process’ (Strömbäck, 2008: 239–240).
The case of Russia shows that, even when political control over influential media (e.g. 
broadcasters) remains much higher than Strömbäck suggests in his democracy-based 
description of Phases II–IV, the existence of at least partially free internet and social 
media, as well as citizens’ access to foreign news outlets, provide conditions under which 
non-democratic politicians have to adapt to the ever increasing mediatisation of politics. 
State-sponsored journalists, meanwhile, are drawn ever more into the orbit of commer-
cial imperatives and their associated professional norms which do not always coincide 
precisely with the needs of the state. Furthermore, digitally-empowered audiences 
increasingly evade control, as ordinary citizens become media actors, and the content of 
online communications is impossible to subject to comprehensive censorship.
Despite the constraints, non-democratic politicians attempt to harness the process of 
mediatisation to their advantage, for example, by using new media technologies to flood 
online space with contradictory messages, so that audiences are confused as to what nar-
rative to believe. In fact, from Vladimir Putin’s first presidency, his government’s 
engagement with the media has been based on the assumption that ‘the mediated realities 
replace . . . a belief in objective realities’ (Strömbäck, 2008: 240) that Strömbäck associ-
ates with Phases III and IV (Tolz and Teper, 2018). Importantly, however, Strömbäck 
distinguishes Phase III, when, like Putin, politicians still perceive media as ‘a strategic 
tool’ external to them (2008: 239), from Phase IV when they ‘internalise’ media logic 
which ‘colonises’ politics, and when instrumentalisation breaks down under the weight 
of self-contradiction. Equally important is Strömbäck’s recognition that several phases 
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Political logic, however, requires the needs of political institutions and the political sys-
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main communication channel between citizens and politicians. At Phase II, the media 
cease unconditionally mediating the messages preferred by political actors. It is at this 
point that commercial imperatives assert themselves in a context when the battle for 
people’s attention takes precedence over traditional journalistic norms and values 
(Strömbäck, 2008: 237–240). Landerer goes further, redefining mediatisation itself as 
‘the predominance of audience-oriented market logic in political actors’ behaviour in 
day-to-day decision-making processes’ (2013: 240). At Strömbäck’s third phase, politi-
cal and social actors must adapt to a fully marketised media logic rather than the reverse 
(2008: 238). In the fourth phase, ‘more or less consciously [political actors] allow media 
logic’ and its accompanying commerce-driven standards of newsworthiness to ‘become 
a built-in part of the governing process’ (Strömbäck, 2008: 239–240).
The case of Russia shows that, even when political control over influential media (e.g. 
broadcasters) remains much higher than Strömbäck suggests in his democracy-based 
description of Phases II–IV, the existence of at least partially free internet and social 
media, as well as citizens’ access to foreign news outlets, provide conditions under which 
non-democratic politicians have to adapt to the ever increasing mediatisation of politics. 
State-sponsored journalists, meanwhile, are drawn ever more into the orbit of commer-
cial imperatives and their associated professional norms which do not always coincide 
precisely with the needs of the state. Furthermore, digitally-empowered audiences 
increasingly evade control, as ordinary citizens become media actors, and the content of 
online communications is impossible to subject to comprehensive censorship.
Despite the constraints, non-democratic politicians attempt to harness the process of 
mediatisation to their advantage, for example, by using new media technologies to flood 
online space with contradictory messages, so that audiences are confused as to what nar-
rative to believe. In fact, from Vladimir Putin’s first presidency, his government’s 
engagement with the media has been based on the assumption that ‘the mediated realities 
replace . . . a belief in objective realities’ (Strömbäck, 2008: 240) that Strömbäck associ-
ates with Phases III and IV (Tolz and Teper, 2018). Importantly, however, Strömbäck 
distinguishes Phase III, when, like Putin, politicians still perceive media as ‘a strategic 
tool’ external to them (2008: 239), from Phase IV when they ‘internalise’ media logic 
which ‘colonises’ politics, and when instrumentalisation breaks down under the weight 
of self-contradiction. Equally important is Strömbäck’s recognition that several phases 
may be in operation simultaneously, and that ‘different institutional actors in a society’ 
may attain ‘different phases’ at any one time (2008: 241). This, we argue, describes the 
situation pertaining in Putin’s Russia, and Strömbäck’s model informs our analysis 
throughout.
Strömbäck was writing before the Internet, let alone social media, had become a cen-
tral driver for the mediatisation not just of politics, but of everyday life. Phase IV effects 
and the severe constraints they place on political instrumentalisations of media therefore 
makes the situation of current Russian journalists (particularly those at the helm of influ-
ential state-sponsored media organisations) markedly different from that of their prede-
cessors in the Soviet, and even recent post-Soviet periods. The Kremlin appreciates that 
journalists are often better placed than politicians to decide how particular political posi-
tions should be framed and in what formats they should be presented to the public. As 
Tolz and Teper (2018) show, even the most controlled media outlets in non-democratic 
states – broadcasters – are given leeway to experiment. Therefore, regular meetings 
between representatives of the Russian presidential administration and media executives 
tend to resemble brain-storming sessions, rather than fora for communicating top-down 
instructions (Pomerantsev, 2013).
Assertions that belief in the power of ‘mediated realities’ encourages the Kremlin and 
its media machine to dispense with facts altogether (Pomerantsev, 2015) are, as we will 
show, implausible. It is one thing for the Kremlin covertly to use websites of uncertain 
provenance, bots and trolls whose real identities are hidden in order to systematically 
disseminate fabricated stories. However, this approach is not an option for state-affiliated 
broadcasters if they want to meet market objectives and maintain or expand audiences. 
Even if broad journalistic autonomy – the ‘latitude journalists have within the opera-
tional routines of reporting’ (Reich and Hanitzsch, 2013: 135) – is limited, journalists 
who have higher positions in the institutional hierarchy or are star presenters are able to 
exercise agency by making important editorial choices in the coverage of specific stories. 
As our analysis shows, Russian broadcasters need to maintain credibility, keeping their 
narratives believable and, thus, ‘sellable’.
In discussing the concept of credibility in the media, defined as news needing ‘not just 
[to] be seen’, but ‘believed’, Vultee argues that credibility (or believability) is ‘con-
structed between journalists and audiences’ (2010: 14). Journalists are aware of this and 
when audiences clearly signal scepticism about a particular narrative, a response strategy 
is quickly designed to preserve audience loyalties and market shares. Thus, mediatisation 
facilitates two related, but sometimes conflictual, forms of enhanced journalistic agency: 
the agency afforded to reporters by state sponsors adopting Phase III strategic, media-
instrumentalisation logics; and that necessitated by the internalisation of commercial 
media logics of professional credibility and competitiveness characteristic of Phase IV. 
The tensions generated when these two forms of agency clash form a key component of 
our analysis.
State-led missions to harness mediatisation are often compromised by the multi-actor, 
global reach of ‘media events’, which blur boundaries between major news stories and 
their mediations. Media event theory originally referred to the closely managed co-pro-
duction and oversaturation by states and media of ritual occasions (Dayan and Katz, 
1994), and was expanded to include ‘disruptive’ events like terror attacks or natural 
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disasters in an acknowledgement of the fact that media events reveal political cleavages 
as much as shared values (Hepp and Couldry, 2010; Katz and Liebes, 2007). Within an 
increasingly networked communications environment, the role of audiences as co-pro-
ducers of media events grows, diminishing the controlling influence of individual states 
and the dominance of their preferred narratives (Hepp and Couldry, 2010: 24). Therefore, 
state-affiliated media no longer operate as mere tools to maintain state power or negate 
temporary challenges to it arising from unanticipated ‘disruptions,’ and the success of 
state-preferred narratives becomes uncertain.
Domestically, Russian state-sponsored broadcasters have attempted to limit this 
uncertainty whilst exploiting public interest in disruptive media events, by repackaging 
long-existing problems as new, disruptive occurrences whose sudden but pre-planned 
oversaturated coverage makes them easier to strategically manage (Tolz and Teper, 
2018). But what happens if a genuinely unexpected disturbance to Russian state equilib-
rium occurs, triggering over-saturated coverage within a global system in which media-
tisation’s logics are fully internalised? Such was the case with the Salisbury incident 
which was immediately turned into a major media event in the UK. Despite a two-day 
delay, the Russian side ultimately had no choice but to respond similarly.
Case selection and methods
The transnational media event that developed around the Skripal poisonings was inevi-
tably dominated by narratives of security. Derived from a war context, securitising nar-
ratives claim to identify an existential threat to a particular object, demanding 
rule-breaking approaches to dealing with that threat (Waever, 2011). In security matters, 
state actors play a crucial role, as they deploy emergency powers and attempt to exert 
control over the message that is communicated to citizens. Yet citizens must be con-
vinced of the need for such an emergency response, rendering the media framing of the 
chosen issue critical to securitisation (Gillespie, 2007: 275). Russian state reliance on 
media articulations of its preferred message and, crucially, the impact of this message on 
audiences, is thus particularly exposed in the context of security-related media events. 
Mediatisation works hand-in-hand with burgeoning security discourses, just as it con-
verges with dominant market logics. The fact that the Salisbury poisoning occurred at 
this three-way intersection makes it a particularly instructive case study.
Our empirical data consist of the outputs of two broadcasters: Russia’s Channel 1 and 
RT, which were allotted key roles in disseminating Kremlin-preferred interpretations of 
the Salisbury poisoning to domestic and foreign audiences. Channel 1 is partly owned 
and funded by the Russian government and partly by Kremlin-loyal private enterprises; 
RT is a Russian government-funded international broadcaster. We deploy a socio-narra-
tive approach to the news-making dynamics of the Salisbury media event, focusing on 
how the narratives that drive inter-state conflicts playing out across the global medias-
phere are co-constructed by media and state actors, as well as audiences, through ‘pro-
cesses of collaboration, consensus and coercion’ (Harding, 2012: 292).
Our analysis incorporates daily news bulletins of Channel 1 and RT in the three-day 
spans around 13 major developments (Table 1), plus analysis of web stories published 
within 3-day spans of seven of these (indicated in bold).1 We also analysed all of the 
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tisation’s logics are fully internalised? Such was the case with the Salisbury incident 
which was immediately turned into a major media event in the UK. Despite a two-day 
delay, the Russian side ultimately had no choice but to respond similarly.
Case selection and methods
The transnational media event that developed around the Skripal poisonings was inevi-
tably dominated by narratives of security. Derived from a war context, securitising nar-
ratives claim to identify an existential threat to a particular object, demanding 
rule-breaking approaches to dealing with that threat (Waever, 2011). In security matters, 
state actors play a crucial role, as they deploy emergency powers and attempt to exert 
control over the message that is communicated to citizens. Yet citizens must be con-
vinced of the need for such an emergency response, rendering the media framing of the 
chosen issue critical to securitisation (Gillespie, 2007: 275). Russian state reliance on 
media articulations of its preferred message and, crucially, the impact of this message on 
audiences, is thus particularly exposed in the context of security-related media events. 
Mediatisation works hand-in-hand with burgeoning security discourses, just as it con-
verges with dominant market logics. The fact that the Salisbury poisoning occurred at 
this three-way intersection makes it a particularly instructive case study.
Our empirical data consist of the outputs of two broadcasters: Russia’s Channel 1 and 
RT, which were allotted key roles in disseminating Kremlin-preferred interpretations of 
the Salisbury poisoning to domestic and foreign audiences. Channel 1 is partly owned 
and funded by the Russian government and partly by Kremlin-loyal private enterprises; 
RT is a Russian government-funded international broadcaster. We deploy a socio-narra-
tive approach to the news-making dynamics of the Salisbury media event, focusing on 
how the narratives that drive inter-state conflicts playing out across the global medias-
phere are co-constructed by media and state actors, as well as audiences, through ‘pro-
cesses of collaboration, consensus and coercion’ (Harding, 2012: 292).
Our analysis incorporates daily news bulletins of Channel 1 and RT in the three-day 
spans around 13 major developments (Table 1), plus analysis of web stories published 
within 3-day spans of seven of these (indicated in bold).1 We also analysed all of the 
broadcasters’ relevant current affairs broadcasts across the analysis period (using the 
search terms ‘Skripal’ and ‘Novichok’). We interrogated audience responses by analys-
ing over 600 comments made on a selection of videos that these broadcasters uploaded 
to YouTube around key developments in the case, focusing particularly on responses to 
RT’s interview with the suspects. Here we collected comments within the first two 
hours following the video’s uploading when, for some reason, RT did not switch off the 
comments section, and when there was little sign of state-affiliated bot or troll manipu-
lation since the overwhelming majority of comments were utterly disdainful of RT and 
of the Kremlin. Comments were coded inductively according to their main themes 
which arose from a collaborative analysis of social media comments (Chatterje-Doody 
and Crilley, 2018).
The power of media logic
The initial framing of the Salisbury incident by both Russia and the UK was as a major 
security threat. While the UK Foreign Secretary described the poisoning as the first use 
of chemical weapon on European soil since WWII (Johnson, 2018), his Russian counter-
part accused Britain of attempting to destabilise the international order and Channel 1 
reporters called the UK’s position a ‘declaration of war’ (Vremya pokazhet, 7 March 
2018; 13 March 2018). For both sides such framings were politically expedient. In 
Russia, the presidential election campaign was underway, and claims about heightened 
Table 1. Salisbury media event chronology and analysis periods.
Dates Milestones
5 March 2018–7 March 2018 Wiltshire police declare major incident; 
Metropolitan police announce a ‘nerve 
agent’ used
12 March 2018–14 March 2018 PM Theresa May attributes responsibility to 
Russian state; UK expels 23 Russian diplomats
15 March 2018 France, Germany, UK, USA issue joint statement
17 March 2018–19 March 2018 Russia expels 23 diplomats; OPCW starts testing 
substance
5 April 2018–7 April 2018 Russian media airs Viktoria and Yulia Skripal 
phone calls
9 April 2018; 18 May 2018 Yulia and Sergei Skripal released from hospital
12 April 2018 OPCW summary report released
23 May 2018–25 May 2018 Yulia Skripal video statement
04 July 18–6 July 18 Reports of Amesbury Novichok poisoning
05 September 2018–7 September 2019 British police charge two suspects
13 September 2018–15 September 2018 RT interview with suspects
26 September 2018–28 September 2018 The Insider/Bellingcat reveal ‘Boshirov’ as 
GRU agent
08 October 2018–10 October 2018 The Insider/Bellingcat reveal ‘Petrov’ as 
GRU doctor
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security threats and Western Russophobia could potentially bolster Putin’s position. For 
the UK, the incident helped burnish the prestige of a government tarnished by its han-
dling of Brexit, whilst enhancing cooperation with the EU.
However, during the 6 months from the first announcement of the poisoning to the 
release of images of the suspects, there was an information vacuum at the heart of the 
event, something noted by Independent journalist, Mary Dejevsky, who argued plausibly 
that ‘both the UK and Russia know more than they have told’ (Dejevsky, 2018). As the 
Russian government denied responsibility, it, too, obviously refrained from providing 
Russian media with specific information. The UK government and intelligence services 
occasionally drip-fed insights. As a result, the incident turned into a media-driven inter-
pretation hotspot rife with speculation, rumour and conspiracy theories. This confusion 
rendered the crisis a classic example of mediatised foreign policy-making (Esser and 
Strömbäck, 2014: 13–19), for which traditional approaches based on ‘principled delib-
eration’ were rejected in favour of media logic with its focus on the unique and the sen-
sational, and on journalists’ role in shaping the public discourse.
Russian broadcasters adopted three approaches derived from the affordances of the 
mediatised public sphere: media-centricity, a mirroring effect and a meta-level subver-
sion of the very conventions of public engagement with international disputes. Rather 
than attempting to win a long-term battle of ideologically-driven narratives as during the 
Cold War, state-affiliated media outlets operating under conditions of heightened media-
tisation seek short-term gains related to the traction of individual stories within the 
hybrid media system. This accorded Russian journalists additional levels of agency, as 
interpretative frames were co-produced by broadcasters and the Russian Foreign Ministry 
in accordance with their ability to grab attention of media audiences.
Media-centricity
Media-centricity – focusing coverage of a story on its treatment by other media outlets 
and bringing outlets or journalists themselves to the forefront of the story – was a key 
feature throughout the Salisbury crisis. Actions by both states were consistently taken 
with their subsequent mediation in mind, such as the Russian state-sanctioned telephone 
conversations between Yulia Skripal and her cousin Viktoria; Yulia’s video interview 
facilitated by British Intelligence; and the hoax telephone call to Boris Johnson by 
Kremlin-friendly pranksters.
Russian broadcasters began covering Salisbury 2 days after the first reports in the UK 
media; Channel 1’s and RT’s initial reactions on 6 March 2018 were limited to summa-
ries of BBC News coverage (RT News, 6 March 2018; Vremya, 6 March 2018). Much 
subsequent Russian coverage continued to amount to cross-reporting and critiquing UK 
(and other Western) media narratives. Virtually every Channel 1 talk show from March 
to September started with a critical survey of UK media. RT reporters argued that the 
poisoning was a media-driven story in which media speculations had no bearing on what 
actually happened. On 12 March, an RT reporter introduced a new frame – ‘media 
frenzy’: ‘[A]mid the media frenzy over the poisoning. . . the attacks today are discussed 
at the very highest level in Britain’. (RT News, 12 March 2018). The same day, on 
Channel 1’s evening news programme, Vremya, the Russian presidential spokesman also 
Tolz et al. 29798 Journalism 00(0)
security threats and Western Russophobia could potentially bolster Putin’s position. For 
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dling of Brexit, whilst enhancing cooperation with the EU.
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eration’ were rejected in favour of media logic with its focus on the unique and the sen-
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Russian broadcasters began covering Salisbury 2 days after the first reports in the UK 
media; Channel 1’s and RT’s initial reactions on 6 March 2018 were limited to summa-
ries of BBC News coverage (RT News, 6 March 2018; Vremya, 6 March 2018). Much 
subsequent Russian coverage continued to amount to cross-reporting and critiquing UK 
(and other Western) media narratives. Virtually every Channel 1 talk show from March 
to September started with a critical survey of UK media. RT reporters argued that the 
poisoning was a media-driven story in which media speculations had no bearing on what 
actually happened. On 12 March, an RT reporter introduced a new frame – ‘media 
frenzy’: ‘[A]mid the media frenzy over the poisoning. . . the attacks today are discussed 
at the very highest level in Britain’. (RT News, 12 March 2018). The same day, on 
Channel 1’s evening news programme, Vremya, the Russian presidential spokesman also 
mentioned ‘UK media frenzy’, contrasting ‘hysterical’ Britain and calm, rational, fact-
seeking Russia. The media-centricity was regularly visualised through screenshotted UK 
news headlines on Channel 1 and RT studio screens. The constant dearth of new develop-
ments in the case made such media-centricity even more inevitable.
Media outlets and individual journalists themselves were inexorably sucked into the 
drama, with a rapidity, and in a manner, over which states exercised limited control, 
demonstrating that the affordances of Phase IV mediatisation readily mutate into haz-
ards. Thus, RT was forced extensively to cover UK regulator OFCOM’s investigation 
into its alleged impartiality breaches during the Salisbury crisis, as well as attacks on it 
as Putin’s ‘propaganda network’ by British MPs (RT News, 18 April 2018; 05 July 2018). 
On 7 March 2018, Channel 1’s news anchor was drawn involuntarily into a global media 
story when he opened the main news bulletin with a veiled warning to anyone who con-
templated betraying Russia (Vremya, 7 March 2018). This was splashed across Western 
media prompting the anchor to later report sardonically on his unexpected status as inter-
national ‘celebrity’ (Vremya, 12 March 2018).
The mirroring effect
Media-centricity transforms narratives into reverse mirror images of one another (Hutchings 
and Miazhevich, 2009). This was particularly evident on the Russian side, as broadcasters 
systematically inverted the meanings of British accounts. For example, the murders of 
Russian defectors in the UK, regularly referred to by British outlets, were repeatedly cited 
with ironic undertones by Channel 1 and RT as they strove to neutralise their implications 
for Russia’s Salisbury narratives. The Russian broadcasters acknowledged potentially 
Russia-incriminating elements in the British accounts, simultaneously refuting their con-
nection to the Russian state and according the accounts ‘Russophobic’ meaning (Vremya 
and Vremya pokazhet, 7 March 2018; Worlds Apart, 1 April 2018). Such responses were 
hastily improvised to bolster narratives whose rapid global remediation and constant need 
for recalibration reflects the profoundly mediatised environment that generated them. They 
must be distinguished from the well-honed, selective ‘mimesis’ techniques practiced by 
Soviet propagandists (van Herpen, 2016) safe in the knowledge that their audiences had 
minimal access to the broader messaging strategies of their opponents.
The most important ‘mirroring’ narrative centred on mutual claims that the ‘mediated 
reality’ created by reporting of the Salisbury poisoning had no bearing on ‘objective real-
ity’. UK media persistently levelled this allegation against Russian outlets (Harding, 
2018) which applied it in turn to UK and other Western media. An RT journalist adopted 
this line in the channel’s very first Salisbury report. ‘It is remarkable that with so few 
facts, the mystery of what’s made Sergei Skripal ill has captured the hearts and minds of 
journalists in the UK’ (RT News, 6 March 2018). Channel 1, which delayed the start of 
its detailed Salisbury coverage, first articulated this narrative a week after the incident, 
with Vremya’s anchor claiming: ‘This is a noisy campaign which appears to be specifi-
cally organised for [UK] newspapers and television’ (11 March 2018). The same day, the 
Russian Foreign Ministry made a similar assertion: ‘We have not received a single piece 
of evidence. Instead, we are just watching reports on [UK] television’ (quoted on Vremya, 
11 March 2018); Putin himself asserted that he ‘found out about it [the poisoning] only 
from the mass media’ (Vremya, 19 March 2018).
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In another gesture characteristic of a fully mediatised operating environment, Vremya’s 
anchor exhibited an intuitive meta-level grasp of media logic’s market imperatives, ask-
ing of The Sun’s Salisbury coverage: ‘Is this a tabloid newspaper method to increase 
sales?’ (4 July 2018). An RT reporter, meanwhile, commented: ‘You can see why it’s a 
big story. It’s got all the hallmarks of a Le Carré spy novel’ (RT News, 6 March 2019). 
To reinforce the narrative of UK media’s market-driven construction of a fake, ‘mediated 
reality’ Russian broadcasters frequently invoked a SKY TV spy-thriller, ‘Strike Back’, 
featuring a stand-off between British and Russian agents. Channel 1 and RT incorporated 
clips from the thriller into news reports, buttressing their claims that accusations against 
Russia were media fakery (RT News, 18 March 2018; Pust govoryat, 5 April 2018). The 
most self-consciously provocative reverse mirroring of UK media coverage was the 
claim made by a participant in a Channel 1 talk show that this reflected a ‘mediated real-
ity’ whose production was tightly controlled by British politicians. ‘I want to tell the 
viewers . . . Do not think that there is media freedom in the UK. All newspapers cover 
the story in the same way. This can never happen by itself. [Their] press is tightly con-
trolled by politicians’ (Pust govoryat, 5 April 2018).
Redefining the rules of the game
The tendency to subvert the adversary’s media discourse through meta-level intuitions of 
its logics and conventions is characteristic of Phase III strategic approaches to mediatisa-
tion, as in Russian broadcaster engagement with UK tabloid media. BBC World News’s 
‘Beyond 100 Days’ programme, which is more tabloid in its sensibilities than news broad-
cast on BBC 1, and whose intensely commercialised operating environment sometimes 
prompted departures from strict BBC impartiality norms, was occasionally included in 
critical surveys of Western coverage. Most references, however, were to tabloids like 
MailOnline, The Sun, Daily Express and The Mirror. In part, this is because their engage-
ment in wild speculations offered a clearer target, and in part because of Russian broad-
casters’ greater affinity with UK tabloid irreverence than with BBC propriety.
After the first 2 days, engagement with the BBC was restricted to strategically planned 
initiatives such as the interviews given by Putin, Viktoria Skripal and RT’s chief editor 
Margarita Simonyan. By contrast, in its daily output, Channel 1 and RT mounted a sus-
tained dialogical, and hyper-irreverent, confrontation with the UK tabloids and it is here 
that Russia’s attempt to subvert the rules by which political and diplomatic crises are 
normally discussed began. The approach baffled UK politicians and journalists; on the 
BBC’s Newsnight, Evan Davis began asking perplexedly of the Russian refusal to adopt 
an appropriate tone ‘Why are they not taking it seriously? What is their game?’ (6 April 
2018). Russia’s strategy, however, matched RT’s long-term self-positioning as an alter-
native to the mainstream media not only in content (its reporting of neglected stories), 
but also in style (its adoption of the colloquial register and of mocking humour associ-
ated with tabloids and social media). RT rationalises this approach by contrasting the 
‘artificial’ impartiality of ‘hypocritical’, mainstream Western broadcasters, and its own 
‘authentic’ appreciation of the impossibility of objectivity and acknowledgement of the 
role of emotions and strong political preferences among audiences (Chatterje-Doody and 
Crilley, 2019).
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RT journalists used their well-honed skills to lead the Russian state’s discursive 
response to UK accusations. Ironically, however, this meant that whilst Channel 1 report-
ers could afford the provocative indulgence of blaming UK, US and Ukrainian politi-
cians or intelligence services for the attack (Vremya, 5 April 2018 and 4 July 2018; 
Vremya pokazhet, 12 March 2018), RT, operating in an OFCOM-regulated environment, 
was more circumspect, relying on a less brazen form of mocking sarcasm towards accu-
sations against Russia. Meta-level exploitation of the rules of discursive propriety asso-
ciated with Phase III mediatisation here encounters the less pliant, hyper-networked 
media environment characteristic of Phase IV.
Nonetheless, RT’s irreverence intensified in the third of our identified periods (17–19 
March 2018) which followed the expulsion of Russian diplomats. Thenceforth, its cover-
age contained pre-prepared entertainment packages that included bizarre emojis seem-
ingly contrived to manipulate audiences’ emotive responses to Salisbury (RT News 18 
March 2018). Humorous stories about bad-taste attempts by businesses to market 
‘Novichok’-named products appeared as news items on RT’s website between April and 
July (RT, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d). RT gave headline billing to a hoax phone call to UK 
Foreign Minister Boris Johnson during the Salisbury crisis, in which Kremlin-friendly 
Russian pranksters, Lexus and Vovan, posed as Armenia’s prime minister (RT, 2018f).
Both Channel 1 and RT strove to mobilise digital tools to their advantage by selec-
tively citing tweets, Facebook and blog posts that chimed with the Russian position, even 
though, from the early stages, opinion polls in the UK indicated high levels of blame for 
Russia (YouGov, 2018). In apparent coordination with the Russian Foreign Ministry, RT 
began using hashtags in its twitter communications that mocked the UK position, such as 
#Russiadidit and #highlylikely, adopted by Foreign Minister Lavrov on the same day 
(RT News, 16 March 2018). This illustrates the subordination of political to media logic 
as envisaged at mediatisation Phase III, which, however, still permits politicians to reas-
sert a degree of control.
Indeed, speaking on the BBC, a number of political observers watching the ‘battle of 
narratives’ around the Salisbury poisoning claimed that the Russians put the UK on the 
‘back foot’ (BBC News, 5 April 2018). The Newsnight moderator argued: ‘Information 
seems to come out of the British only after it’s been raised by the Russians. If it is a 
propaganda war, it’s not felt as though the British are winning. . .’ A leading political 
analyst participating in the same programme agreed that Russian propaganda is played 
‘like an orchestra . . . They are really good at it’ (6 April 2018). However, this widely-
held view was shattered thanks to the roles of non-state actors and audiences in the co-
production of media events - a quintessentially Phase IV mediatisation phenomenon.
Digital (mis)appropriations, non-state actors and unreliable 
audiences
Much scholarship has focused on how Russian digital media users unwittingly reinforce 
Kremlin-preferred narratives (Gaufman, 2015; Meijas and Vokuev, 2017; Szostek, 2018). 
This trend dominated the early stages of the Skripal story. Later developments, however, 
demonstrated the limits of any state’s ability to impose their preferred narratives on audi-
ences. While online audience commentators and twitter users lend themselves to 
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selective quotation and manipulation, these actors are not always pliable and can directly 
threaten mainstream broadcaster narratives. The complex assemblages of actors operat-
ing within the hybrid media environment (Chadwick, 2013), can both enhance and chal-
lenge the predominance of state-preferred narratives, accelerating the diffusion of agency 
and creating alternative centres of power offering only transient opportunities for state 
co-option. As the last stage of the Salisbury-poisoning story demonstrates, this presents 
heightened dangers to non-democratic governments.
A complex inter-braiding of domestic and international allegiances and audiences 
informed RT’s interview with the Salisbury suspects. The Kremlin’s initial concern was 
to keep domestic audiences onside with its hedged account attributing blame to British 
intelligence, or to other foreign actors. In turn, RT offered more nuanced versions of 
counter-accusations than those aired on domestic television. Initially, RT’s English-
speaking audiences seemed to endorse the Russian line: the 60 videos on RT’s YouTube 
‘Skripal’ playlist were viewed more than 1.6 million times, receiving 32,000 upvotes 
compared with 4200 down-votes. On one video, 73 percent of audience comments 
referred to a British state conspiracy (Crosstalk, 13 March 2018). Comments on audi-
ences’ forums can be manipulated, of course, and the impact of Russian trolls and bots 
on those has been widely discussed elsewhere (Jamieson, 2018). However, coordinated 
Russia-sponsored interventions in these forums might not be as comprehensive, let alone 
efficient, as is often surmised. RT’s handling of on-line reactions to its interview with the 
Salisbury poisoning suspects offers a compelling example.
On 5 September 2018, the UK media, with reference to the pain-staking investigative 
work of UK and Russian ‘citizen journalists’ (Tolz, 2018), reported the identification as 
suspects of ‘Ruslan Boshirov’ and ‘Aleksandr Petrov’ via CCTV images (the timing of 
whose release, like that of the Yulia Skripal video, reconfirmed the British security ser-
vices’ influential media management role). A week later, Putin announced that Petrov 
and Boshirov had been found, and that they should contact the Russian media. On 13 
September, RT released a YouTube video interview, available simultaneously in Russian 
and with English subtitles (RT, 2018g, 2018h). The interview was conducted by 
Simonyan, RT’s editor-in-chief, who maintains close Kremlin ties (Seddon, 2016). The 
interviewees’ answers to Simonyan’s questions elicited universal contempt. 74% of com-
ments analysed in response to RT’s English-language YouTube video of the interview 
challenged the suspects’ claims. Some English-speaking viewers stated that the inter-
view had changed their opinion of the whole affair: ‘Not a very convincing interview at 
all . . . I wasn’t doubting the Russian government until I saw this interview’.
The interview also failed with domestic audiences, vitiating RT’s reputation as an 
agile instrument of the Russian state. In an implicit acknowledgement that it was now 
impossible credibly to deny Russia’s culpability, Channel 1 allotted minimum coverage 
to Simonyan’s interview and the revelation of the interviewees’ true identity. Its talk 
shows, which, in the previous 6 months, reported on the Salisbury case virtually every 
day, even in the absence of any specific news, ignored this vital development. Indeed, 
only 6% of the top 100 comments responding to the Russian-language YouTube inter-
view were explicitly hostile to the UK, whilst over 70% ridiculed the suspects and/or 
Russia. Echoing many on-line comments, one user declared: ‘Until today I perceived this 
Skripal story as Britain’s provocation. But once I saw these two idiots, my view was 
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challenged the suspects’ claims. Some English-speaking viewers stated that the inter-
view had changed their opinion of the whole affair: ‘Not a very convincing interview at 
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The interview also failed with domestic audiences, vitiating RT’s reputation as an 
agile instrument of the Russian state. In an implicit acknowledgement that it was now 
impossible credibly to deny Russia’s culpability, Channel 1 allotted minimum coverage 
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shaken.’ Another aptly observed: ‘By posting this video and not disabling comments 
you’ve dropped yourselves right in the shit.’ Such scepticism filtered into audience per-
ceptions of RT, with 19% of the comments analysed specifically criticising the channel 
or Simonyan, whose attempts to protect her journalistic identity misfired.
As the interview debacle indicates, online communities and citizen journalists can 
assume disproportionate importance to national broadcasters, forming complex assem-
blages with them, and compounding their anxieties over their precarious hold on their 
most committed audiences. Following the disintegration of the state-endorsed narrative, 
Putin was forced to alter his own messaging protesting Russia’s innocence, as he branded 
Skripal a treacherous scumbag (podonok) undeserving of concern (Financial Times, 
2018). RT’s continued use of mocking sarcasm, for example, by claiming that the main 
damage caused by the interview was to Salisbury’s image as a tourist destination (2018a) 
and its sale of t-shirts bearing inscriptions derived from Simonyan’s exchanges with the 
suspects, barely improved the credibility of its collapsed narrative with audiences.
The incident underscores a dilemma faced by all states and journalists operating in 
Phase IV environments. On one hand, the greater the information gaps created by the 
withholding or slow release of key facts during media events, the more control states 
exert over their favoured broadcasters. Moreover, temporary alignments with one or 
more of the multitude of non-state media actors now populating the hyper-networked 
mediasphere can authenticate the narrative preferences of the states involved (Russia’s 
with Lexus and Vovan embarrassing the UK’s Foreign Secretary; the UK’s Bellingcat 
revealing the suspects’ identities). Yet because broadcasters now act within that same 
environment, the larger the information gaps, the greater the likelihood that diverse other 
actors will fill them with revelations or speculations, liable to divert state narratives.
Mediatisation and journalistic agency
As mediatisation progresses to its later phases, another set of tensions arises between the 
political logic of the state actors striving to appropriate it and the increasingly commerce-
driven media logic that journalists of all hues are obliged to follow. This was not, how-
ever, immediately apparent in Russia’s strictly managed approach to the Salisbury 
incident. Irrespective of what individual Russian journalists personally thought, they 
were compelled to embrace the official narrative denying Russia’s culpability. Yet a 
closer look reveals different levels of agency accorded to Channel 1 and RT journalists, 
with the agency of latter being significantly more extensive than of the former. Channel 
1 took almost a week to report on the case in significant detail. Throughout its Salisbury 
output, Channel 1’s journalists directly blamed actors other than Russia, polemically and 
systematically endorsing the Russian Foreign Ministry’s line. A covert example of jour-
nalistic agency was apparent in Channel 1’s decision abruptly to cease coverage once 
Simonyan’s interview had backfired.2 This was in contrast to Russia’s fully state-owned 
channel Rossiya, which continued its assertions of Russian innocence throughout the rest 
of September (60 minutes, 13 September 2019; Vecher s Vladimirom Solov’evym 13 
September 2018; Rossiya-24 Novosti 17 September 2018).
RT, however, operates in a different legislative-commercial environment from 
Channel 1. It competes for audiences as part of a wide package of international media 
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outlets, including Western mainstream media, and RT management is acutely aware of 
its audiences’ media consumption habits (Seddon, 2016). For this reason, it provided 
detailed accounts of the unfolding events more promptly than Channel 1. Moreover, even 
though the channel was sanctioned by Ofcom for breaches of impartiality, RT’s journal-
ists tended to avoid directly assigning blame to the UK or other non-Russian actors. 
Instead such assertions were usually delegated to external interviewees. RT was also 
highly pro-active in framing the official Russian position through its trade-mark sarcastic 
humour when refuting the UK government’s claims.
Intuiting the need to protect their professional credibility in a media environment 
dominated by narratives hostile to Russia, certain RT journalists were far bolder than 
their domestic counterpart in signalling ambiguity towards official narratives. In her 
interview with the father of the assassinated Russian defector Aleksander Litvinenko, 
Oksana Boyko, RT’s star presenter, explicitly invoked evidence pointing to Russia’s 
responsibility for the assassination. She challenged Walter Litvinenko’s assertions that 
his son was killed by US intelligence services (Worlds Apart, 1 April 2018) bolstering 
that challenge via a visual performance of scepticism regarding her interviewee and a 
studied distance towards the official Kremlin ‘script’ for her task in bringing him to the 
attention of anglophone audiences. In a context where Western media constantly linked 
the Litvinenko and Skripal cases, Boyko’s hedged challenge to Walter Litvinenko’s 
assertions had implications for her interpretation of the Salisbury poisoning. Significantly, 
Ofcom found no impartiality breach in Boyko’s interview (Ofcom 2018) which, how-
ever, contrasted with Litvinenko’s appearance on Channel 1, where his claims were 
unquestioningly endorsed (Pust govoryat, 05 April 2018). When appearing on UK media, 
RT journalists distanced themselves from the Russian line still further. Facing a hostile 
panel and studio audience on BBC Question Time (15 March 2018), RT journalist Afshin 
Rattansi openly acknowledged the possibility that the Kremlin ordered the poisoning 
(also reported by RT, 2018e).
Like Boyko, Simonyan used verbal tone and facial expression to relay her scepticism 
about her interviewees’ claims. When asked about her interview with the suspects on 
Channel 1’s Vremya, she refused to confirm that she believed them, insisting that ‘as a 
journalist I only believe what I see myself’ (Vremya, 13 September 2018). On the day of 
the interview, she further attempted to re-perform her identity as an inquisitive, truth-
seeking journalist in a BBC Newsnight phone interview (13 September 2018). However, 
she dramatically hung up when the presenter Kirsty Wark, questioned RT’s status as a 
professional media organisation. Simonyan’s angry exit appeared to be motivated less by 
Wark’s sudden aggression (Simonyan is accustomed to rebutting Western criticism of 
RT) than by how this tactic undercut her performance of an identity she presumed to 
share with ‘a fellow professional’.
These examples suggest that Russian broadcasters performed distance from the 
Kremlin-sponsored narrative at the point when the credibility of their outlets and/or spe-
cific journalists were overtly at stake. This was particularly apparent on RT, whose over-
all output, contrary to widespread perceptions, is not universally tendentious and includes 
some quality programming, such as Boyko’s Worlds Apart. RT management has internal-
ised media logic’s commercial imperatives more completely than its domestic counter-
parts, recognising that without examples of credible journalism, its already modest 
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outlets, including Western mainstream media, and RT management is acutely aware of 
its audiences’ media consumption habits (Seddon, 2016). For this reason, it provided 
detailed accounts of the unfolding events more promptly than Channel 1. Moreover, even 
though the channel was sanctioned by Ofcom for breaches of impartiality, RT’s journal-
ists tended to avoid directly assigning blame to the UK or other non-Russian actors. 
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interview with the father of the assassinated Russian defector Aleksander Litvinenko, 
Oksana Boyko, RT’s star presenter, explicitly invoked evidence pointing to Russia’s 
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that challenge via a visual performance of scepticism regarding her interviewee and a 
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(also reported by RT, 2018e).
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Channel 1’s Vremya, she refused to confirm that she believed them, insisting that ‘as a 
journalist I only believe what I see myself’ (Vremya, 13 September 2018). On the day of 
the interview, she further attempted to re-perform her identity as an inquisitive, truth-
seeking journalist in a BBC Newsnight phone interview (13 September 2018). However, 
she dramatically hung up when the presenter Kirsty Wark, questioned RT’s status as a 
professional media organisation. Simonyan’s angry exit appeared to be motivated less by 
Wark’s sudden aggression (Simonyan is accustomed to rebutting Western criticism of 
RT) than by how this tactic undercut her performance of an identity she presumed to 
share with ‘a fellow professional’.
These examples suggest that Russian broadcasters performed distance from the 
Kremlin-sponsored narrative at the point when the credibility of their outlets and/or spe-
cific journalists were overtly at stake. This was particularly apparent on RT, whose over-
all output, contrary to widespread perceptions, is not universally tendentious and includes 
some quality programming, such as Boyko’s Worlds Apart. RT management has internal-
ised media logic’s commercial imperatives more completely than its domestic counter-
parts, recognising that without examples of credible journalism, its already modest 
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audience would be eroded. Its star presenters enjoy a degree of editorial autonomy not 
normally associated with it. Sam Delaney, a British political satirist given his own RT 
show, commented that he was ‘astounded by the freedom’ he was given (2018). The 
degree of agency available to journalists traditionally depends on their positions in the 
organisational hierarchy (Reich and Hanitzsch, 2013). Thus, Simonyan is RT’s editor-in-
chief. However, the examples of Boyko, a high-profile presenter, Rattansi, who worked 
for the BBC and CNN and is entrusted to represent RT when it is invited to appear on UK 
media fora, and Delaney, whose alternative comedy reinforces RT’s image as a maverick 
disruptor, indicate that ratings, audience shares, USPs and brand values now assume 
equal importance to bureaucratic rank in the distribution of agency.
Conclusion
The reporting of the Salisbury poisoning appeared to indicate a reversion to classic media 
event mode; on the Russian side in particular, the incident’s heavily securitised context 
prompted a tightly coordinated collaboration between government and state-aligned tel-
evision in which journalistic agency was subordinated to political mandates. However, 
closer scrutiny of the mediatised environment in which the Salisbury crisis unfolded 
reveals that such an account does not fully capture the dynamics of coverage. The grow-
ing dominance of media logic and market imperatives within the Russian media system 
and wider global communications environment complicates the state’s efforts to mobi-
lise television outlets for its political and security goals. Moreover, contrary to the stipu-
lations of much mediatisation theory (Brommesson and Ekengren, 2017: 4), the 
internalisation by political actors of media logic does not require key national media to 
be independent. Neo-authoritarian states’ broadcasters operate within this globally con-
nected environment in which multiple independent media providers and non-state actors 
respond differently to the same events and to each other.
Contemporary mediatisation accords a growing range of media actors extensive 
access to digital platforms. This decreases state control of news narratives during secu-
rity crises like Salisbury, obliging them to respond to a proliferation of transnational 
rumours. Combined with the global circulation of news flows facilitated by digitisation, 
this in turn means that media events are effectively co-produced by multiple actors and 
outlets of diverse provenance, making it impossible for single states to maintain control 
of the narrative trajectories of such events.
When analysing the far-reaching, contradictory influence of the global media envi-
ronment on journalistic agency, especially in neo-authoritarian states, we should 
acknowledge tensions and relationships between different phases of mediatisation. On 
one hand, states like Russia operating within Phase III mode recognise the value of 
delegating a degree of agency to preferred broadcasters better placed to exploit the 
new affordances and logics offered by social media than government operatives; they 
continue to perceive the media environment as a ‘strategic tool’ capable of serving 
their interests and of informing their own behaviour to beneficial effect; Foreign 
Ministry officials thus internalised RT’s meta-level intuition of the rules of conven-
tional media discourse, adopting a tabloid-like, hyper-irreverent stance towards them, 
and towards received modes of diplomatic engagement – much to the bemusement of 
their opponents.
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On the other hand, the accelerated pace and unprecedented reach attained by the circula-
tion of competing narratives compromised the ‘reverse mirroring’ strategy according to 
which Russian broadcasters strive to utilise media-centricity to their advantage by provoca-
tively inverting the meanings of the attacks on their veracity. This pushes them constantly 
onto the back foot, pointing to the preponderance of media logic over political logic symp-
tomatic of Phase IV; Putin himself was forced dramatically to change his account of the 
Salisbury affair following the RT interview debacle. Phase IV, however, also brings with it 
a second form of enhanced agency specific to state-aligned journalists working within it: 
that derived from the commercial mandates placed upon international broadcasters. It is 
this that accounts for the distancing practices adopted by RT journalists required to cleave 
closely to the Kremlin line; and for the concern with audience credibility and professional 
reputation exhibited by RT executives and presenters who, as in the example of Simonyan’s 
hubristic decision to conduct the notorious interview, and her equally unwise sortie into 
BBC terrain, are as liable to derail as to advance state messaging strategies.
Indeed, through its catastrophic interview, RT ultimately fell victim to the competing 
agency of the audiences whom it wanted to convince of the unreliability of the UK position 
and who form part of the complex assemblages of media actors rendering Phase IV of the 
mediatisation process ever more resistant to state co-option. Thus, media events like Salisbury 
appear to represent a greater risk for neo-authoritarian broadcasters than for their counterparts 
in democratic states, because, in the context of transnational media events, sceptical digitally-
empowered audiences can ensure that fabricated narratives unravel. The interview’s recep-
tion, Russian and international, confirms this insight, challenging perceptions of a fully 
controlled, hierarchically structured propaganda machine honed for ‘information war’. 
Kremlin aspirations notwithstanding, Russian broadcasters are subject to the complex vagar-
ies of the same digital news-making environment as their western counterparts.
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Notes
1. BBC News at 10 (domestic audiences) and BBC Beyond 100 Days (news breakdown aimed 
at US audiences) accessed via https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand; Channel 1’s Vremya 
and talk shows: accessed via the channel’s archive at https://www.1tv.ru/; RT daily news 
broadcasts recorded by our team; RT current affairs programmes archived at www.youtube.
com/rt. Programmes cited in-text by name and date aired.
2. Whereas Channel 1’s Vremya pokazhet covered the Salisbury poisoning virtually every 
day from 7 March to 12 September 2018, strikingly, on 13 September it pointedly did not. 
After Simonyan’s interview there were no further news items or talk shows dedicated to the 
Salisbury poisoning on the Channel, including on 27 September when further revelations 
about the identities of the suspects came out.
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